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BOOK REVIEWS
By Frank E. Cooper. Michigan
Legal Studies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1951.
Pp. 470. $5.00.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS.

The importance of the administrative law field has become more and
more recognizable in the United States. The creation and expansion of
new governmental agencies, the restrictions and new revenue measures and
the enormous number of regulations to be followed by the administrative
agencies have necessitated a number of authors to assemble materials necessary to clarify this comparatively new field. Consequently, it is not surprising
that the editor of Michigan Legal Studies has added to his list of renowned
books the one of Professor Cooper, a member of the Detroit Bar and
Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, on the subject of
administrative agencies.
The book under review, Administrative Agencies and the Courts, is a
modem approach to the subject matter. In it the author attempts to
describe the standards which the courts impose upon administrative agencies, whereby they control and limit the powers of the agencies. The 470
pages have been divided into five parts with the Administrative Procedure
Act' serving as the final guide.
Part one has been set out as the Place of Administrative Agencies in
the Judicial System. Mr. Cooper defines administrative law and gives the
reader an insight into the historical background of this branch of law. The
most recent changes in the administrative law field came after 1932 when
many new federal agencies exercising important regulatory functions came
into being.2 The author states that many administrative agencies serve
primarily the function of accomplishing what ordinary legal remedies cannot
normally achieve; in other words, by the particular regulation the party can
be protected or preventative measures can be asserted prior to harm being
done. This particular phase is dwelt upon, giving first-hand information as
to the individual functions of the specific agency. Cooper feels that the
task of the lawyer in conducting cases before administrative agencies is a
difficult one. As an example he cites the fact that when the lawyer is
searching for the law concerning administrative procedure he finds himself
involved in the process of sifting the information from the numerous headings in the law digests and encyclopedias. Consequently, much time is spent
1. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946).

2. E.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Wage
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, Social Security Board, Bituminous Coal
Division.
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in the preparation of cases in only seeking previous court decisions. The
attorney will find that there is quite a difference between administrative
and judicial proceedings. One must bear in mind that the attorney's role
is more difficult in that the opponent is quite frequently the administrative
agency itself; whereas, in judicial proceedings, the practitioner is not as
much concerned with whom his adversary might be.
The second part of this book concerns itself with the Underlying Constitutional Question: effect of separation of powers doctrine on delegation
to administrative agencies of legislative and judicial powers. The author
writes that administrative agencies are permitted to exercise powers which
logically belong to the courts or to the legislature, so long as the independence of the courts or of the legislature is not impaired. Many of the agency
problems are discussed, such as the delegation of powers by an agency to
its employees. It is pointed out that in the decision of a case wherein an
agency employee is delegated to use his discretion, he, the employee, will
often make such a determination as he thinks will please his employer, in
the hope of obtaining a promotion. By the same token, if the employee is
impressed with a belief that the agency likes decisions which find an
employer guilty of unfair labor practices, or a commercial concern guilty
of unfair trade practices, or an employee entitled to receive workmen's
compensation, then much consideration and thought has to be given to
these matters to avoid the same problem of pleasing the officials, who will
pass upon the employee's personal advancement. However, the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act goes far toward alleviating this problem in
many of the federal agencies. 3 Cooper recommends that much might be
accomplished by 1) careful formulation for the guidance of agency
employees of instructions for the application of those policies which have
been crystallized; 2) consideration by the agency heads of cases where the
application of established policies is difficult or where policies have not
been definitely formulated (with encouragement for the referral by agency
employees of cases thought to fall within this category); and 3) the requirement of periodic and informative reports by those employees entrusted with
power to make decisions.
At times statutes do not have an affirmative requirement of notice
and hearing. Query: Is the statute void because of such omission? By the
clear weight of authority there is no deprivation of due process if notice
and hearing were in fact afforded by the administrative authorities, even
though the statutes do not specifically require such procedure.
Part three has been pegged, Procedure in Adjudication of Cases, In
this section Cooper delves into the matter of parties and pleading. It must
be remembered that unlike judges, administrative officers are almost always
concerned with the outcome of the case as parties in interest. Undoubtedly,
the decisions will have an effect upon future cases arising on the administra3.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT, supra note 1, see

§ 8a, b.
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tive level, and the aforementioned is probably the main factor in differentiating the administrative from the judicial procedure. At times, the
administrative agencies allow an interested party, not connected with the
case, to enter and introduce testimony, cross-examine witnesses, etc., similar
to an arnicus curiae's part in judicial proceedings. rhis is a healthy situation,
because it tends to make for better informed administrative action, saving
much time, and eliminating the introduction of extraneous issues. He
dwells at length on the prehcaring conferences and informal procedures,
right to a fair trial, presentation of evidence, official notice and the role of
discretion.
Rule Making is the subject matter of part four. The author begins
with the development of rule making activities and points out that as far
back as the first Congress (1790) authorization was given by that body to
the President to promulgate rules and regulations. Emphasis is placed upon
the legal effect of rules, criminal penalties for violation of rules, effect of
reliance on regulations and problems of retroactive application. The
general tests of the validity of the rules or regulations are discussed, as for
instance, conflicts with statutes, non-relationship to statutory purpose and
violation of due process.
The last part, part five, is based upon Judicial Review. It is believed
by many that the courts should exercise a general superintending control
over the actions of administrative agencies. This has proved to be impractical. The general trend of court decisions (except in cases where a statute
prescribes a broad review) is in the direction of reducing the scope of review.
Delay involved in judicial review is a determining factor, e.g., business transactions cannot always await the final outcome of lengthy appellate
procedures, and administrative orders might have been changed by the time
the case comes to trial, thus making the questions involved moot before
the court can pass judgment on the case. Issues of law, jurisdictional facts
and constitutional facts are not overlooked. We must recognize the fact
that the litigant is required to address his complaint initially to administrative tribunals, rather than to the courts. He is further required to exhaust
all possibilities for obtaining relief through the agency before appealing to
the courts. The common law and statutory methods of review are considered under the general heading.
The reviewer, in reading this book, was rcmindcd of an earlier administrative law casebook which he had the pleasure of using in the classroom,
namely that of Dean Stason4 who incidentally wrote the foreword to
Cooper's book. After having re-read both the textbook and casebook, it
appears that Mr. Cooper has very commendably followed to a certain degree
the organizational pattern used by Dean Stason. It is obvious that much
4.

STASON,

CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

(2d ed.

1947). For reviews see 33 IowA L. REv. 427 (1948), 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 923 (1948),
26 TExAs L. R.Ev. 250 (1947), 27 TxAs L. REv. 11 (1948).
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time has been spent by Cooper in the preparation and assembling of these
materials, as evidenced by several hundred cases advantageously used to
emphasize his opinions. The author has used clear and concise language.
He has approached the subject matter from a very practical point of view.
In my opinion Mr. Cooper's book would serve a useful purpose in the
library of the student, the practitioner and the theorist.

G. Huco

\VEIDHAAS
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1932-1949: THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF A CONSTITOOL. By Virginia Wood. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1951. Pp. ix, 436. $6.00.

DUE PROCESS
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TUTIONAL

This is a valuable study of the work of the Court in an era in which a
substantial percentage of its work has been concentrated during the past
two decades and in which there are fewer than usual signposts in the Contitution to guide the justices in their deliberations. The principal purpose
of Professor Wood in her analysis of the Court's interpretation of the
due process clause is to demonstrate that the "Constitutional Revolution"
of 1937 was already well under way five years earlier insofar as this part of
the Constitution was concerned. Emplo)ing the categories of the freedoms
of the First Amendment, socio-economie legislation, criminal proceedings,
administrative actions and the tax power, she finds that in each of these
areas the Court had laid down the precedents which enabled it in 1937 and
thereafter to build a new structure of values for due process.
While it has been generally recognized that the pre-Roosevelt Court
considerably extended the scope of the due process clause to the freedoms
of the first amendments and the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings, this reviewer for one had not fully realized that in the other areassocio-economie legislation and administrative action (the dividing line here
being most tenuous)-the great majority of decisions favored the states in
the first four or five years of the period under consideration. Starting with
Justice Sutherland's statement in Stephenson v. Binford (1931) that the
Court would not overrule the legislative judgment as to the necessity of a
given economic policy, Professor Wood builds up a line of decisions in
which the Court displayed willingness to permit a greater degree of economic
experimentation by the states. She states that after 1932 "generally speaking,
a majority of the justices . . . had held that our constitutional system does
not require judicial protection of the free enterprise, laissez-faire system."
There are, it is true, few exceptions to this statement but the pattern
they seem to form is interesting and has not been noted by Professor Wood,
although she has written that they are some of the most momentous
decisions of the 1930's. The exceptions as listed by the author are Carter v.

